The battle of (the) Klöntal or Claenthal was fought near Lake Klöntal (in the namesake valley) on 30 September1 October 1799 during the Revolutionary Wars (Second Coalition, Suvorov's Swiss campaign).
Suvorov came up with 'Napoleonic plans' to get out of the difficult strategic situation in which he found himself. Suvorov's operational goal was to reach Glarus through the Klöntal. His Russians and Austrians under Bagration's tactical control, numbering plus or minus 2,100, were pressing against the French frontline troops in rounded numbers 3,800 men, or up to 6,500 in all, under Molitor. Masséna sought to completely surround Suvorov's forces, and as a result, he reinforced Molitor in the process to block Suvorov's escape. The number of Frenchmen who participated in this battle before Masséna's reinforcements arrived is unknown. The battle ended in an Allied victory. In total, the Allies had greater than or equal to 4,160 men, but it was not only those who participated; also, it is not specified that the given French numbers were all involved. One way or another, Suvorov managed to concentrate enough forces in the Klöntal to displace the French troops present there.
Suvorov stopped his advance following the "Glarus" battle (1 October), where the future French Marshal Soult would manage to stop Bagration and his reinforcements, but only around Näfels, which was not Suvorov's operational objective at the time. The capture of Glarus proved to be the limit of Suvorov's availability, and he preferred not to try to advance further.
Background Having descended into Mutten valley and waiting for the rest of the troops to arrive, Suvorov sent a hundred mounted Cossacks on the morning of the 28th to the right, toward the side of Glarus, to gather some information about Friedrich von Linken. The Cossacks returned with bad news: there was no rumor about Linken, and the Klöntal was occupied by the French. It was no longer a vague rumor, like the one carried in Altdorf: Korsakov and Hotze are smashed and far thrown back, Jellacic (Jelačić) retreated, a strong French corps occupied Glarus, and Masséna pulls together troops to Schwyz.
French triumphs
The disaster occurred on September 25–26; Korsakov arranged his troops in the worst possible way and not only did not take measures against his enemy's attack, — he was "asking for defeat". Masséna, on the contrary, prepared for battle with prudence, with skill and in deep secrecy; with the same skill and restraint, he made an attack. According to a comment of the 1799 war's historian, Dmitry Milyutin, Masséna's attack on the Limmat had, in its general course, very much in common with Suvorov's passage through the Adda, but at the same time Korsakov did not resemble Moreau at all. The Russians were caught unawares; from complacency, arrogance and carelessness, their leader went to the "other extreme" and completely lost his head. The disorder was incredible, bordering on complete chaos. The right flank, under the command of , remained idle during this affair, deceived by the French demonstrations; it wandered at random and only by chance escaped annihilation. The detachment of 5,000 men to assist Hotze, per the general plan of action, was executed only on the attack's eve of Masséna and contributed to the disorder increase; however, it is very doubtful that these troops's presence could change the affair's outcome, — due to the complete actions' fragmentation and the lack of general orders. If to all this add a preponderance of forces on the French side, it becomes clear why Rimsky-Korsakov was subjected to a complete defeat at Zurich and his corps suffered terrible losses. The number of killed, wounded, and prisoners extended to 8,000, including many officers and 3 generals; banners lost 9, guns 26, and the wagon train nearly all.
The outcome could have been even more ruinous if the Russian troops by their selfless bravery and fortitude had not partially compensated for the high command's shortcomings. Masséna himself did them justice in this respect. The Russian troops retreated to the Rhine's right side and encamped near Schaffhausen, destroying bridges behind them. The French pursued them only at first: Masséna was concerned about Suvorov's movement.
Simultaneously with the battle of Zurich, the battle of the Linth was also taking place. At the very beginning, Hotze and his chief of staff were killed; the Austrian troops suffered a complete defeat, losing nearly half of their men killed, wounded and captured. They retreated through St. Gallen to Rheineck and there crossed toward the Rhine's right side, destroying the bridges behind. The victorious French general Soult pursued them very feebly; his attention was also turned to the Linth and the Reuss' upper reaches.
Other separate Austrian detachments, although they avoided the Korsakov and Hotze's deplorable fate, but also completely abandoned Suvorov, Jellacic and Linken, fulfilling the campaign's general plan, moved forward; the first of them, meeting stubborn resistance and then hearing about the disaster at Linth, fell into such a panic that he retreated across the Rhine to Maienfeld. Linken did even worse; being together with Jellacic stronger than the French general Molitor, against whom they both acted, he did not help Jellacic, acted slowly, and only increased by this the French courage and determination. He must have realized how imperative it was for him to move forward and open communication, or at least communication, with Suvorov. In spite of this he, being in the same forces with Molitor, stood against him at Glarus on the 27th and 28th, without making a general attack, and when he learned of the Limmat and Linth events and the retreat of Jellacic, he himself retreated. Meanwhile, on this last day, the 28th, a hundred of Suvorov's Cossacks reached the Klöntal, to open communication with him,—needlessly. Thus Linken without being pursued by anyone withdrew all the way to Ilanz.
Suvorov's state Alexander Suvorov's situation in the Muottental was desperate. There were no warm clothes, and even the summer clothes looked like shirts, and shoes even worse; there was almost nothing left in people's dry bags; the bundles with provisions were still dragging behind; there were no cannons, except for mountain artillery; charges and cartridges were running out; cavalry horses were dehydrated and emaciated by complete fodderlessness. The feat was so difficult that it required the complete unanimity of everyone, the highest degree of unity between the leader and his subordinates, the rise of moral strength to the last limit. Suvorov ordered a council of war to meet at his house, inviting the Grand Duke and 10 generals; the Austrian General Auffenberg was not summoned. The first to appear at the meeting was Bagration; Suvorov, in full field-marshal's uniform, greatly disturbed and agitated, paced about the room, uttering curt words, the ineptitude of warfare, the art of being beaten, and so on. He paid no attention to Bagration, perhaps even did not notice his arrival at all, so that Bagration thought it more appropriate to go out and appear with the others. Suvorov met them with a bow, closed his eyes, as if gathering his thoughts, and then with fire in his gaze, with an animated face began to speak strongly, vigorously, even solemnly. No one had ever seen him in such a mood. Explaining briefly what happened at the Limmat, at the Linth, and with the rest of the Austrian detachments, Suvorov, not restraining his indignation, recalled all the difficulties in the course of the Italian campaign, which constantly had from Thugut and the Hofkriegsrat.
International historians testify that Suvorov, seeing himself trapped, became so furious that he decided to knock the French out of Schwyz and go to the rear of his enemy's army, and that only the persistent persuasion of several persons kept him from such a desperate intention. Russian sources say the opposite, and one of the campaign participants claimed that Austrian officers of the general staff pointed Suvorov to Schwyz as the best course of action, but he did not agree. It is very probable that Suvorov, on the first impulse, wanted to go to Schwyz.
Suvorov was left against the French in the entire theater of war alone, exhausted, without food, without artillery, and, without any hope for anyone's help. It was not that Suvorov, whom everyone was accustomed to see in battle, on the campaign, in the camp, then formidable, then joking and whimsical, but always looking forward with full confidence in success, and did not allow the thought of failure, much less defeat. Hardly anyone had ever seen tears in his eyes before; no one had ever seen anxiety and excitement on his face in former years, to the extent that. All those present instinctively moved forward to lift Suvorov from the feet of the Grand Duke, but Constantine Pavlovich, himself shaken to the depths of his soul, had already raised the Field Marshal to his feet and, all in tears, embraced him and covered him with kisses. Then all, as if "by prior agreement", glances turned to Wilhelm Derfelden, who enjoyed universal respect for his personal and military qualities in addition to his seniority. Derfelden addressed Suvorov with a heartfelt word, but with brevity, which always brought Suvorov in delight. He said that now everyone knows what has happened, and see what a difficult feat ahead of them, but Suvorov also knows to what extent the troops were devoted to him and with what selflessness he is loved. Therefore, "no matter what troubles ahead, no matter what misfortunes may have fallen, the troops will bear everything, will not shame the Russian name and if they are not to prevail, at least they shall lie down in glory". When Derfelden finished, "all in a voice, with enthusiasm, with passion confirmed his words, swearing by the name of God, and there was no flattery on their tongue, nor deceit in their hearts". Suvorov listened to Derfelden with closed eyes and lowered head; "when there was a heartfelt, fervent cry of those present, he raised the head, looked at everyone with a bright look, thanked and expressed his firm hope that there would be a victory, a double victory,—over the enemy, and over treachery".
Suvorov's disposition of troops instructed Rosenberg's corps to remain in the rearguard and hold their enemy from Schwyz until all the packs had passed over Mount Bragell (now Pragel). Rosenberg was ordered to hold firm, to repel the French with all his strength, but not to pursue them beyond Schwyz. Those who took part in the council of war bowed to Suvorov and went away, carrying in their hearts an unprecedented impression and retaining traces of it in their facial expressions; especially Derfelden and Pyotr Bagration looked angrily and menacingly.
Having ascertained that Suvorov must already be at the Muottental, Masséna ordered some of his troops to concentrate there, and others to reinforce Molitor around Glarus, so as thus to lock up to the Russians these two only exits from the trap into which they had fallen.
The battle