The Somalia affair was a 1993 Canadian military scandal, prompted by the beating to death of Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager, by two Canadian peacekeepers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The act was documented by photos, and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Military leadership were sharply rebuked after a CBC reporter received altered documents, leading to allegations of a cover-up. The Somalia affair tarnished Canada's international reputation in what was heralded as "the darkest era in the history of the Canadian military".
Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being cut short by the government, resulting in a public backlash, the Somalia Inquiry exposed problems in the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada's elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, greatly damaging the morale of the Canadian Forces. It also led to the immediate reduction of Canadian military spending by nearly 25% from the time of the killing to the inquiry.
Background In 1992, Somalia was in the middle of both famine and a civil war. The country was under domination by warlords, following the collapse of Siad Barre's government. Relief supplies were frequently stolen by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the population. As a result, the United Nations requested armed peacekeepers to assist the relief operations.
In the summer of 1992, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney committed Canada to United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). Canada was being pressured by the United Nations to make this decision because in the past it had aggressively engaged in Yugoslavia in 1992 and had reached out through humanitarian evacuation programs like Operation Parasol to Balkan refugees later that year. The heightened media coverage on Somalia had also put more pressure on the Canadian government to mobilize a peacekeeping effort. Thanks to the Mulroney government's desire to improve conflict resolution mechanisms and for its natural interest in multilateralism and peacekeeping, Canada found the Somali Civil War to fit its foreign policy priorities. Mulroney was himself a "Pearsonian" and a multilateralist who had a great deal of confidence in the United Nations.Dawson, Grant. Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia. (UBC Press, 2007), pp. 7, 11, 40 Canadian diplomat Geoffrey Pearson argued that "effective multilateral arrangements provide a means to exert influence on major allies and powerful neighbours as well as help maintain peace". Mulroney's notion of new internationalism coupled with this notion of multilateralism would see intervention as a moral imperative in cases of intrastate disorder and large-scale human rights abuse. He commented that it would be ideal for the United Nations to become still more effective and more of an actor in international affairs.
Contributing to the US-led coalition and taking part in the UN force to Somalia seemed to align with Canadian foreign policy and fit Mulroney's vision for peacekeeping, as he was the "principal driver behind Canada's decision to commit itself to the Somalia mission".
Canada was one of the nations that agreed to send forces. Canadian forces, under the name Operation Deliverance, were sent to Somalia to participate in the American-led Operation Restore Hope.Swanenburg, Marten. "Accountability of Peace Support Operations", p. 265 On 4 May 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II.
It was decided that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) would be the contingent sent overseas. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in Cyprus as well as later peacekeeping tours there. However, General Beno informed General Lewis MacKenzie that training in the CAR was a "critical" problem due to Lieutenant Colonel Paul Morneault's leadership. It was debated whether to substitute another regiment, or cancel the mission entirely, but it was finally decided that to admit that the "elite" Canadian forces were incapable of handling a routine mission would have been a "national disgrace".
Canadian Airborne Regiment
Only recently deemed a light infantry battalion, some leaders expressed concern that the Somalia mission did not fit the Regiment's mandate or abilities. The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada's regular infantry regiments. Later, LCol. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. LCol. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.Fisher, Luke. Maclean's, "Airborne's Hazing Exposed", January 30, 1995
There had been recurring discipline problems, and an ongoing investigation into their base of CFB Petawawa as a hotbed of white supremacist activity in 2 Commando. This included the adoption of the confederate flag as the commando's barracks-room decoration. The flag had initially been presented as a gift from American soldiers, and gradually became an unofficial symbol, although successive commanding officers had tried to ban its usage.
Footage depicting racist actions of Cpl. McKay and Pte. Brocklebank was later brought forward by Scott Taylor, who hoped to expose systemic problems in the military and exonerate his friend Kyle Brown. In the video, McKay utters racial slurs,In the video, McKay says "we ain't killed enough niggers yet" (Armstrong, 1997). and pre-deployment photographs showed him wearing a Hitler shirt in front of a swastika.Leyton-Brown, David. Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 199. p. 120 A video taken by CAR soldiers shows Brocklebank making racist and violent remarks.Burke, Carol. "Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane and the High and Tight", p. 60
Mike Abel, the only Canadian to die in the Somali operation, was allegedly a member of the Ku Klux Klan; colleagues disputed the evidence that racist literature had been found in his belongings, and asserted that it just floated around the camp and everybody read it.Ogle, James & Darnell Bass. "What Manner of Man", pp. 144, 163Taylor, Scott R. Esprit de Corps, "Mysterious, suspicious and preventable deaths in the Canadian forces", July 1, 1997
Airborne in Somalia The CAR was deployed in December 1992 as part of the Unified Task Force. It was accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Although they were planning to deploy to the comparatively quiet port city of Bosaso, four days after arriving in Somalia commander Serge Labbé informed them that consultation with the Americans meant they would be moving to the southern town of Belet Huen, considered one of the more difficult areas to patrol.Schmidl, Erwin A. "Peace Operations Between War and Peace". p. 95
One of the Dragoons' first tasks, under command of Sgt. Donald Hobbs, was rebuilding a bridge that had been destroyed on the Chinese Highway linking Belet Huen and Matabaan. The loss of the bridge meant the only way around was through a partially cleared minefield.
On January 2, Canadian forces seized an AK-47 from a local Somali who returned the following day with a machete to threaten the troops to give him back his gun; a warning shot was fired and ricocheted, hitting him in the foot. He left, refusing medical care. Also in January 1993, Lt.-Col. Carol Mathieu gave verbal orders allowing Canadian soldiers to shoot at thieves under certain conditions. On January 29, suspected bandits were found congregating on a roadway and as Canadian forces approached them, they began to flee. Warning shots were fired into the air to halt them, leading to a retaliatory shot from a Somali, and returned fire from the Canadian troops.
On February 10, they fired on a crowd approaching a Red Cross distribution centre.
On February 17, a demonstration of 50–300 Somalis crowded together on the Bailey bridge over the Shebelle River, and when some began throwing rocks at the Canadian Forces, soldiers fired two shotgun blasts, killing one Somali and injuring two others. A later investigation cleared the shooters of any wrongdoing; noting they were justified in their response.
By the end of the mission, no Canadian troops had been killed or wounded by enemy forces, the sole casualties arising when a soldier shot himself in the arm while cleaning his sidearm on January 11, and when MCpl. Tony Smith negligently discharged his rifle, fatally wounding Cpl. Abel on May 3, 1993.
March 4 killing On March 4, two unarmed Somalis were shot in the back,CBC The National, Somalia debacle a high-level cover-up, July 2, 1997 one fatally, after Canadian troops laid an ambush to try to catch petty thieves stealing from the military base in Belet Huen. This followed from a decision by Captain Michel Rainville to re-label petty theft by Somalis as "sabotage", a distinction that meant deadly force could be used to defend the base. Rainville relied on the argument that a fuel pump used to service American MedEvac helicopters had been stolen deliberately to hinder the military effort, while critics pointed out that any saboteurs likely would have ignited the thousands of gallons of fuel surrounding it.
After Warrant Officer Marsh discovered the missing fuel pump, he suggested installing a large searchlight atop a tower to deter thieves. He was dismissed by Rainville, who suggested that the idea was not to deter thieves, but to catch them in the act using night vision. Rainville ordered that food and water be placed in a trailer at the south end of the compound, visible to Somalis walking past on the nearby road. Some soldiers alleged this constituted "bait", but Rainville later defended himself saying it had been to distinguish between thieves and saboteurs to prevent shooting thieves.
Rainville enlisted Cpl. Ben Klick of the PPCLI to lie in a truckbed at night, awaiting potential "saboteurs" with a C3A1 rifle. From his position, he watched two Somalis, Ahmed Arush and Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie, approach the food and water. Fifteen minutes after first noticing the pair, Ahmed and Abdi began to run from the base in fear they had been noticed; Rainville yelled at them to "stop", and called to Sgt. Plante, Cpl. King and Cpl. Favasoli to "get them". Plante fired with his shotgun, while King fired with his C7; Plante's shot wounded Sabrie, who fell to the ground, while Arush kept running back towards the roadway. Cpl Leclerc and MCpl Countway both shot at him as he ran, while Cpl. Klick refrained, noting that the man presented no risk to Canadian forces. Arush fell to the ground, hit by one of the two men's shots. He struggled to stand up, but both men fired again, killing him.
It was noted that Sabrie had been carrying a ceremonial dagger in his clothing. When the unit was ordered to bring the body of Arush to the same position as Sabrie, the soldiers radioed back that they could not move the body without it falling apart. So the body of Arush was loaded into a body bag and placed inside a Bison personnel carrier. There, medical technician MCpl Petersen re-opened the bag and took Polaroid photographs for an unknown reason, some suggest to document the shooting, others suggest as a "trophy". The photos showed gaping wounds in Arush's neck and the side of his face, with his skull twisted out of shape by the force of the gunblast. His intestines protruded from his stomach, and his right eye was missing.